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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a choicetheoretic, general equiljbri
account of the balance of payments adjustmentprocess and the determination
of national price levels ina woriñ comprised of countries populatedby
rational households. Balance of
payments adjustment dynaniics arise in the
equilibrium of this model from the
precautionary saving behavior of risk—
averse households who self—insure against random
productivity fluctuations
by accumulating, via balance ofpayments surpluses in productive
periods, buffer stocks of domesticmoney which can be drawn down to finance
payments deficits, and thus a less variable profile ofconsumption relative
to output, when productivity isunexpectedly low. Precautionary saving
is shown to exhibit the
Partial_adjustment_to_target behavior typically
postulated in the monetary approach literature.The existence of a rational
expectations equilibrium in which the distribution ofinternational reserves
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1.Introduction
This paper provides a choice theoretic, general equilibrium account
of the balance of payments adjustment process and the determination of
national price levels in a world comprised of countries populated by rational
households. The setting is similar in some respects to that proposed by
Mundell (1968) and Dornbusch (1973) in that households consume and produce
a single good, save by accumulating balances of domestic money, and exchange
domestic for foreign currencies at rates which are fixed by central bank
intervention. However, in contrast to the approaches prevalent in the
modern monetary approach literature (as surveyed by Frenkel andJohnson
(1976) and Frenkel and Mussa (1984)), we study the balance of payments ad-
justment process in an explicit general equilibrium framework in which
expenditure, saving, and money demand relationships are based upon the inter-
temporal, utility maximizations nroblerns of risk-averse, forward looking
households who confront random fluctuations in their labor productivities.
Non-trivial balance of payments adjustment dynamics arise in the
equilibrium of this model from the Precautionary saving behavior of risk-.
averse households who attempt to self-insure against unanticipated, country
specific productivity fluctuations by accumulating, via balance of payments
surpluses in relatively productive periods, buffer stocks of domestic money
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balances which can be drawn down to finance payments deficits, and thus
a less variable profile of spending relative to income, when productivity
is unexpectedly low.' An appeal of our inventory theoretic approach is that
we are able to derive the typically postualted properties of
savings behavior in a rational expectations general equilibrium framework
which does not require that money holdings yield Dositive utility. In par-
ticular, the balance of payments adjustment process exhibited in the equi-
librium of this model is driven by the precise sort of partial-adjustment-
to-target savings behavior typically postulated in the monetary approach
literature.
The model developed here is adapted from the work of Foley and
Heliwig (1975) and Lucas (1980) and employs the device of a continuum of
countries which experience independently andidentically distributed pro-
ductivity fluctuations in each period. With no fluctuations in the per
capita world supply of output, there exists a rational exnectations equi-
librium which is characterized by a stationary distribution of international
reserves among countries and constant national price levels which depend
in an explicit way on household's attitudes toward risk and the probability
distribution of productivity shocks. Thus, our analysis makes rigorous
the key role played by the distribution of international reserves among
countries, and not just their aggregate supply, in the determination of
national price levels--a role often emphasized in the monetary approach.
literature Csee especially Dornbusch (1973)).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set UP the
general equilibrium model of international trade and reserve flows, estab-
lish the homogeneity and monctonicity properties of optimal expenditure
and savings functions, and establish the existence of a stationary rationalexpectations equilibrium. In Section 3, we show that equilibrium savings
behavior exhibits the partial-adjustment-to-target properties postulated
in the monetary approach literature. In particular, there exists in each
country a unique target stock of money balances at which planned savings
is zero and expenditure equals expected nominal income. We show that risk-
averse households strive to accumulate money balances in excess of those
requiredto finance a spending flow equal to expected nominal income. Such
bufferstocks of liquidity are held inequilibrium, even though households
discountfuture utility, for self-insurance against unexpectedproductivity
shocks and allow households to attain a less variable profile ofconsumption
relative to output. However, in equilibrium, self-insurance is notcomplete:
real expenditure is shown tobe positively correlated with unanticipated
productivityshocks and is in fact ?darkovian even though shocks are assumed
to be i.i.d. A key result is that, in equilibrium, planned saving in
each country is strictly less than thegap between actual and target money
balances. These properties of equilibrium saving behavior are used toplace
restrictions on the non linear stochastic difference equation which is shown
togovernthe time path of the balance of payments in eachcountry. In
particular, payments imbalances which result from an unanticipated, transi-
tory productivity shock are shown to exhibit persistence which results from
each household's attempt to restore its cash balance position totarget
only partially in any given Deriod. Section 4 provides some concluding
remarks.4
2.TheModel
Westudy a world economy comprised of a continuum of countries, in-
dexed i [0,1] ,eachwith its own central bank and a representative
household. Households have an infinite planning horizon, are risk averse,
and have access to a stochastic, Ricardian technology which transforms labor
intothe single, tradable consumption good. We assume that labor is not
mobile internationally and that no utility is attached to leisure. Time
isdiscrete, and in each period t =0,1, 2, ...thelabor input require-
ment in each country is randomly shocked. These shocks are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed both across countries and time
sothat, with a continuum of countries, there is no fluctuation in the per
capita world supply of output. Normalizing the labor endowment in each
country to unity, let denote the output of country i at date t
Formally, is a drawing from a finite set of non-negative random vari-
ables from the fixed c.d.f. G such that G(O) >0and G() 1 .The
only asset available to each household is domestic money which is the lia-
bility of the domestic central bank and is backed entirely by fiat inter-
national reserves. Denote by H and R the monetary liabilities and
international reserve holdings of the central bank in i at date t,and
let 1/el be the rate at which that bank stands ready to exchange reserves
for balances of its monetary liabilities acquired by central banks in other
countries as the asset of foreign purchases by domestic residents. The
balance shett of the central bank in country i is given in Figure 1.
Trading arrangements are as follows. At the beginning of each period,
before the realization of the productivity shock is known, each household
makes a spending-savings decision. Nominal spending is constrained by
beginning-of-period money balances. One member of each household, the shopper,5
takes a portion of the beginning-of-period money balances and visits other
countries to purchase the consumption good. Purchases must be made in the
- . . 2 seller'scurrency. Upon arriving in a foreign country with goods to sell,
the shopper exchanges domestic for foreign balances with thatcountry's
central bank at the rate of 0f,0h units of foreigncurrency per unit of
domestic currency. The shopper then uses the foreigncurrency acquired
to purchase the consumption good in that country. Theprocess continues
until each shopper exhausts the money balances with which hebegan. While
the shopper is away, the worker in each country learns theproductivity
shock and produces output which is sold to shoppers from other countries who
exchange their home currencies for domestic money balances with the domes-
tic central bank. At the end of the period, shoppers returnhome, divide
their purchases with workers, and consume, while central banks settle claims
amongthemselves. Central banks in countries in which sales (exports) ex-
ceed purchases (imports) gain reserves since foreign currenciesacquired
through trade are convertible to reserves at fixed rate. Given ourassump-.
tionthat monetary liabilities are backed entirely by foreignexchange
reserves, the fixed exchange rate regime is sustainable with certainty.
Denote by p the money price of goods in i at t.Weshall
assume sufficient goods market arbitrage so that national price levels are
linked by the purchasing power parity condition
p =(o1/e3)p (1)
for all i, j[O,lJand t =0,1, 2 An equivalent interpreta-




isequal across all countries i[0,1] in each period t =1,2, .,.
FollowingLucas (1980), we shall study a world economy with a constant per
capita supply of international reserves and seek an equilibrium in which
national price levels are constant. We note, however, that the equilibrium
time paths of spending and the balance of payments will fluctuate in equi-
librium as countries are continually shocked by new drawings of c .In
Section 3, we investigate the persistence of these fluctuations, However,
we must first establish the existence of a stationary rational expectations
equilibrium. We begin with the intertemporal optimization problem of a
representative household.
Each household acts so as to3
max toBtut) (3)





where 0 << 1is the rate at which future utility is discounted,
u : R -Ris a bounded, strictly concave, and twice differentiable utility
function with u'(O) =,andc. is consumption of the household at
time t .Denoteby =pcnominal spending at time t
Letv(H;p; G) be the value of (2) for a household which begins
the period with nominal balances H,facesthe constant domestic price
level p in the current and all future periods, and behaves optimally.
The household's current period decision problem is7
v(H;p;G) =maxu(c/p) +8fV(H-cz+pc; p; G)dG() . (7)
O<a<H
The following proposition, which is proven in the appendix, establishes the
relevant properties of optimal spending behavior implied by (7).
Proposition 2.1: Under the assumptions on u and G,thereexists a
unique, Continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave value func-
tion and a unique, continuous, linearly homogeneous expenditure function
ci(H;p;G) which solves (2). The marginal propensity to spend is strictly
positive and less-than unity. That is, for all A >0
0 <a(H+A;p; G) -cz(H;p;G)<A. (8)
We note that expenditure depends upon money balances, the price level,
and the probability distribution of productivity shocks, since actualproduc-
tivity and thus output is unknown at the time the spending decision is made.
Let s(H;p; ;G) p -a(H;p;G)denote the household's planned ac-
cumulationof moneybalances over the period where Ec ,anddenote
bys(H;p; ;G)pe-cL(H;p;G)realized accumulation of money balances.
Plannedand actual saving will differ whenever actual productivity differs
from mean productivity. The following corollary follows immediately from
Proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.2: There exists a unique, continuous savings function
s(H;p; ;G) which is linearly homogeneous in H and p .Themarginal
propensity to save is strictly negative and less than unity in absolute
value. That is, for all A >0
0 <s(H;p;c;G)-s(H+A;p; G) <A. (9)8
As demonstrated in the appendix, the result that the marginal propen-
sityto spend is strictly less than unity follows from the Inada condition
on preferences andtheassumption that there is a strictly positive prob-
ability that the household will have no output to sell at the end of the
period. Under these conditions, it is never optimal to allow the stock of
moneybalances to be drawn down to zero, or to consume allof any invest-
ment tomoney balances. If u'(O) <or G(0) =0,itwill be optimal
fora household to spend all of its beginning-of-period money balances when.
the latter falls below the threshold level 11, where 11isthe unique
solution to u'(ll/p) =fv'(pE)dG(c)
The international reserve holdings of each central bank evolve accord-




where we have used the fact that H/p =R/Kand the result, established
inthe appendix, that optimal consumption--real expenditure--is a time in-
variant function of real balances. In equilibrium, the per capita demand
for reserves by all central banks must equal the given supplyat the
assumed constant national price levels andimplicitrate of exchange be-
tween reserves and the consuinption.good. The per capita end of period
demand for reserves depends upon the beginning-of-period distribution of
reserves among central banks, J(R) .GivenJ ,theper capita demand
is9
ff(R- uc(R/K; G) +Ke)dJ(R)dG(c) . (11)
Substituting m H/p=R/Kinto (11) andlettingF(m)J(Km) denote
thebeginning-of-period distribution of real balances among countries, we
obtain the following equilibrium condition
ff(m_c(m;G) +c)dF(m)dG(e) =R/K (12)
From the goods-market arbitrage relationship (2), we know that na-
tional price levels are proportional to K ,theimplicit reserves price
of goods. The value of K which satisfies (12) will depend upon the dis-
tribution of real reserves F(in) over countries. For households' expecta-
tions that national price levels be constant over time to be rational, we
require that F(m) be a stationary distribution for the Markov process




The existence of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium is estab-
lished in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3: There exists a unique, stationary rational expectations
equilibrium.The equilibrium distribution of international reserves among
countries does not change over time and is given by J(R) =F(R/K)where
Fis the unique stationary distribution for (13) and Kisthe equilibrium
(implicit) rate of exchange between reserves and the consumption good
K= L'ff(m-c(m;G) +c)dF(m)dG(c) (15)
Inequilibrium,nationalpricelevelsare constant and satisfy, for all
I[0,1]10
=e'/ff(m_c(m;G)+c)dF(m)dG() (16)
Proof: Foley and Heliwig (1975), Proposition 4, pp. 335-336, establish
the existence of a unique stationary F for the Markov process (13) in a
two-state model in which Prob(c =0)=q;Prob(c == 1-q.Theex-
tension to the case in which c takes on more than two values is trivial
and will be omitted. Given F ,Kis uniquely determined by (15). Given
the equilibrium K ,theunique stationary distribution of international
reserves amongcountriesis defined by J(R) =F(R/K).SinceF is a
stationary distribution, we have
fmidF(m) -fmdF(m)
=- fc(m.;G)dF(m) =0; (17)
for all t =0,1, 2, ...sothat the goods market clears in every period
at the constant national price levels p1 =01Kand exchange rates
for all i, 5 [0,1] . Q.ED.
The interpretation of the stationary equilibrium established in
Proposition 2.3 is as follows. If international reserves are initially
distributed among countries according to J ,thennational price levels
p' =01K, [0,1] will clear the goods and asset markets in each
period t =0,1, 2, ...andthe distribution of international reserves
among countries will not change. In this equilibrium, the balance of pay-
ments in each country will be shown to fluctuate in a persistent manner
as national productivities are continually shocked. These payments imbal-
ances will induce reserve flows among countries, but in the aggregate, the
fractionof countries with international reserves less than or equal to
any particular value will remain constant. Alternatively, ifinternational
reserves are initially distributed according to some other J0(R)J(R),11
the system will converge to the stationary rational expectations equilibrium
if households have static expectations. Of course, in this case, static
expectations will only be rational in the limit.5 This convergence under
static expectations is exactly analogous to the properties of the two-country
model studied by Dornbusch ((1973); 1980, Ch. 8) based upon postulated ex-
penditure and savings functions and static expectations.However, in
Dornbusch's analysis the long-run equilibrium in which static expectations
are rational is characterized by a zero balance of payments in each country..
We now investigate the balance of payments adjustment process exhibited
in the rational expectations equilibrium of our model.
3. The Balance of Payments Adjustment Process
In the stationary, rational expectations equilibrium, the timepath
ofthe balance of payments in each country is completely characterized by





ance of payments is not Harkov: knowledge of s alone is not sufficient
to determine the probability distribution ofs÷ However given
{s= s; = wecan calculate
Prob{s1 <s'ls =s; == G((s(s')-s—(s;c))/p). (19)
In order to obtain sharper results, we must first establish additional
properties of optimal precautionary savings behavior. We now show that
saving in each country exhibits the precise set of partial-adjustment-to-12
target behavior typically postulated in the monetary approach literature
(Dornbusch (1973)). We begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: There exists a unique target stock of money balances,
Ht,atwhich spending equals expected nominal income c&(Ht; p; G) =
andplannedsaving is zero, s(H; p; i'; G) =0.(SeeFigure 2.)
Proof: We seek a fixed point to the transition equation
Hi =Ht
-
c1(H;p; G) +pu . (20)
From Proposition 2.1, the rhs of (20) is a continuous, strictly increas-
ing function of H with slope less than unity. It follows that there is
exactly one H suchthat(see Figure 3)
Ts(H; p; .i;G)=0. (21)
Furthermore, since saving is a strictly decreasing function of money bal-
ances, planned saving is strictly positive (negative) when H <(>)H
Q,E.D.
Corollary 3.2: Target money balances strictly exceed target expenditure:
>cz(H'r;p;G)
In the economies studied in this paper, money serves both as a
medium of exchange andasa buffer stock against future unanticipated pro-
ductivity disturbances. For this reason, risk averse households strive
to accumulate money balances which are more than sufficient to finance a
spending flow equal to expected nominal income. In the event of an unan-
ticipated, transitory decline in productivity, households are able to draw
down their inventories of cash balances in excess of target expenditure13
to finance a less variable profile of consumption relative to productivity.
However, in equilibrium, self-insurance is not complete: expenditure is
strictly positively correlated with unanticiapted productivity shocks.
This is most easily seen by expressing expenditure at time t as a func-
tion of time t-l desired end-of-period money balances and the unantici-
pated productivity shock
c$(H; p; G) =cz(Hti+s(H p; p;G)+p(1 —n); p; G) . (22)
The observation follows from the Proposition 2.1 result that expenditure is
a strictly increasing function of H and thus P(c..1 -
Wenow investigate the extent to which households attempt to close
the gap between actual and target money balances via planned saving. The
following proposition establishes that planned saving (in absolute value)
is strictly less than the difference between actual and targetmoney
balances.
Proposition 3.3: Planned saving is strictly less (in absolute value) than
the gap between actual and target money balances. That is, for all
H H(see Figure 4)
os(H;p;ji;G)
1 (23) Ht -H
Proof: H +s(H;p;;G)is strictly increasing in H with slope less than
unity. Thus, for H <Ht,H1=H+s(H;p;p;G)>Hand
+s(H1;p;i.i;G)>H1.Exactlysimilar argument applies for H >Ht
Q.E.D.14
Thederivation of a partial-adjustment accumulation policy from the
intertemporal optimization problem of a risk-averse agent who receives no
direct unity from asset stocks and who faces no cost of adjusting these
stocks is, to our knowledge, new.Dornbusch and Mussa (1975) obtain an
optimalpartial-adjustment policy in adeterministic, interteniporal maxi-
mizationframework inwhich money balances yield positive utility and show
that saving is actually proportional to the gap between actual and target
moneybalances.We again note that the individualsaving behavior derived
aboveis consistent with a general equilibrium in which aggregate saving
is zero in each period at the constant national price levels given by (16).
These results place restrictions on the non linear stochastic dif-
ference equation (18) which characterizes the equilibrium time path of the
balance of payments in each country. These restrictions are now summarized
in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.4.1: The expected current-period balance of payments surplus
is of the same sign and of smaller absolute magnitude than last period's
payments surplus if, last period, there was no unanticipated productivity
shock,
o <E(st1Ic =i;St =s)/st< 1. (24)
Proposition 3.4.2: The expected current-period balance of payments surplus
isof the opposite sign and of smaller absolute magnitude than last period's
payments surplus if, last period, the balance of payments was equal to the
innovationin nominal income (planned savings was zero);
—l < E(st+il=c;s =p(_.i))/s
<0 . (25)15
Proposition 3.4.3: The expected current-period balance of payments surplus
iszero if, lastperiod,therewas nounanticipated productivity stock and
the balance of payments was zero;
=i;St =0)=0. (26)
Proposition 3.4.4: The expected current-period balance of payments surplus
is of Opposite sign and of smaller absolutemagnitude than last period's
nominalincome innovation if,last period, the balance of payments waszero;
0 < E(s1k =c;s =O)/p(P_c< 1 . (27)
The intuition behind the non-Markovian behavior of the balance of
payments is now apparent. If last period's payments surplus was positive
because the household was attempting to replenish its money balances to
target, this period's surplus will, on average, be positive (but smaller)
since only a partial adjustment to target is planned inany given period.
If however, last period's surplus waspositivedue to an unanticipated in-
crease in exports, this period's payments surplus will, on average, be
negative as the household temporarily raises spending above expected
nominal income, attempting to draw down only gradually its excess cash
balances to target (c.f. Frenkel and Mussa (1984),p. 6). Thus, it is
necessary to know both and s to determine the distribution ofs11
Althoughthe conditional distribution ofs1 depends upon the
realizations ofand s. ,wenow show that the expected asymptotic
balance of payments surplus in each country is zero.16
Proposition3.5: The expected asymptotic balance of payments surplus is
zero in each country:
urnE(StISt =s; == 0 (28)
Proof: E(s+Is =s; == pE(m++i!mt)-pE(m+!1nt)where
=4,(s;E)Ip+s/p .But,fromProposition 2.3and Feller (1971) Theoremi, p.249
liin -E(m+Jm))
=Q; (29)
forany initialdistribution of realbalances including
Prob(m =•/p+s/p)=1. Q.E.D.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided a choice theoretic account of the balance of
payments adjustment process in a stochastic, general equilibrium. Clearly,
the model abstracts from much which is relevant to the functioning of actual
fixed exchange rate regimes: capital mobility, the possibility of exchange
crises, the choice of a reserve currency to name just three. Yet, we would
argue that our approach provides a useful first step towards more refined
general equilibrium models which capture these and other features.17
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we establish the properties of the optimal expen-
diture function stated in the text.







where a =H/p.Facinga constant price level, household consumption in
each period is constrained by real balances which evolve according to the
stochastic difference equation (3). Schechtman ((1976); )
andFoley and Hellwig ((1975; Proposition 1, p. 330) prove that there is a
unique value function
v(rn) =max{u(c) .4-fv(m-c+c)dv(c)} (4)
0<c<m
which solves (4). v inherits all the properties of u except that it is
not necessarily twice differentiable; it is strictly concave. It follows




Furthermore,c(in) <m,Viii>0(Foley and Hellwig (1975); Proposition
2(a), p. 330). Since =pc(H/p),spendingis linearly homogeneous in
H and p .Theresults in Section 3 on optimal partial adjustment savings
behavior are new since Foley and Hellwig consider a two state model in which
it is never optimal to hold.the existing stock of cash balances.19
NOTES
'c.f. Samuelson (1968,p. 8)
[Putting money in the utility function] is not the
only way of introducing the real convenience of cash
balances. An even better way would be to let [the
utility function] depend directly only on time
stream of [consumptions}, and then to show that hold-
ingan inventory of [cash balances] does contribute
toa more stable and greatly preferable stream of
consumptions.
2Recall that a fractionG(O) of countries are not productive in any given
period.
3measenotation,we dropthe"i" superscripts when no confusion will re- sult.
shall assume that c = is one of the possible drawings from G
5This argument is maderigorously by Lucas (1980; p. 140).REFERENCES
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